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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a second degree 
felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the information provided by a reliable confidential informant and 
corroborated by Officer Beebe's observations establish reasonable suspicion to stop 
the vehicle in which defendant was riding for further investigation of drug 
distribution? 
2. Was the frisk of defendant justified by the totality of the circumstances, 
including the lateness of the hour, the number of people in the vehicle, the CFs tip 
that drugs were being transported for distribution, the furtive movements of the 
backseat passengers, the observed signs of drug impairment in both the driver and 
defendant, and the officer's knowledge that drug dealers are often armed? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual 
findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. 
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, 1 11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal 
conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including its application 
of the legal standards to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, I f 11-12,103 P.3d 699. 
CONSTTIUTTONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of possession of a controlled 
substance (metiiamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, and 
possession of pciraphemalia, a class A misdemeanor. R.4-3. Prior to trial, he filed a 
motion to suppress. R. 44. The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary 
2 
hearing. R. 176:33-69. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 160-59. The court 
sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison on the felony 
charge and zero-to-one year on the misdemeanor charge. The court ordered the 
sentences to nm concurrent with each other and with the sentence defendant was 
serving at the time. The court also imposed a $50 fine, and ordered that defendant 
complete his current drug program at the prison and get involved in a community 
support program upon release. R. 166-64. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. 
R. 171-68. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
By May of 2006, Troy Beebe, a certified drug recognition expert and officer of 
the Provo City Police Department, had been working with the Utah County Major 
Crimes Task Force for almost three years. R. 176:40,88,94,95. In that capacity, he 
had worked with a particular confidential informant ("CI") on numerous occasions. 
Id. at 34-35. The CI had proved consistently reliable, providing accurate information 
about drug distribution, participating in controlled buys for the police, and helping 
Officer Beebe make multiple arrests. Id. at 35-36. 
1
 The facts are recited "in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling 
denying [a] motion to suppress." State v. Marquez, 2007 UT App 170,f2,163 P.3d 
687. 
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On May 24 th, the CI called Officer Beebe to say that Mary Albert was in Salt 
Lake City, picking up methamphetamine to distribute in Utah County. Id. at 11,36. 
The CI also reported that defendant was traveling with Albert. Id. at 39,51. The 
officer instructed the CI "to call [Albert] back and ask her if she would sell him a 
teener of meth." Id. at 36. The CI did so. Albert agreed to the arrangement and told 
the CI "that she would meet him at her residence in Provo." Id. 
Officer Be€*be and two other detectives set up surveillance in their unmarked 
minivan close to Albert's home. Id. at 37,47. Beebe testified at trial: "Well, in the 
investigation of this distribution of controlled substance we had set up a 
surveillance for a specific vehicle. This vehicle was Mary Albert's vehicle, and we're 
specifically looking for Mary Albert and Jack Wilkinson, and was also - those are 
the two names that I was familiar with and had previous experience." Id. at 89. 
Once surveillance was established, the CI called Mary Albert again, asking 
her where she was. She responded that she was on her way but had to stop to pick 
up a friend. Id. at 37. Later, the CI called once more, asking Albert where she was 
and telling her "he had people waiting for the meth, and that he needed her to 
hurry." Id. Albert "indicated that she was on her way, she was by R.C Willey in 
Orem taking the back roads and would be there shortly." Id. 
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Five to ten minutes later, around 3 a.m., Officer Beebe saw Albert's Jeep 
Cherokee, with which he was "very familiar," approach on a route and after a time 
interval consistent with the back roads between R.C. Willey and Albert's home. Id. 
at 38, 90. As the Jeep drove past, Beebe recognized both Albert, in the front 
passenger seat, and defendant, in the rear seat behind the driver, by sight. Id. at 39, 
90. A total of five people were in the vehicle. Id. at 80. Beebe pulled out and 
followed the Jeep. He turned on his red and blue lights and then "chirp [ed]" his 
siren. Id. at 100-01. The Jeep traveled about 400 feet, "an unreasonable length of 
time" according to Beebe, before finally pulling over. Id. at 41; accord id. at 90-91. 
Before the Jeep stopped, Officer Beebe observed Mary Albert sliding down in her 
seat and then coming back up and the people in the back seat "reaching back behind 
the seat into the very back compartment." Id. at 54; accord id. at 39,91. Officer Beebe 
articulated that he stopped the Jeep to continue his investigation into the 
distribution of controlled substances. Id. at 42,90. 
Approaching the driver, Officer Beebe had two concerns. He testified, 
"Individuals in the drug culture often arm themselves to protect themselves both 
from the criminal element and from law enforcement, and the discard of evidence, 
to hide, secrete [sic], damage, destroy evidence." Id. at 41. Beebe first approached 
the driver, Mary Albert's son, and asked him to step out of the vehicle. Id. at 42,93. 
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Beebe immediately observed that he had bloodshot eyes and was speaking very 
loudly, which the officer testified were both indicators of methamphetamine use. Id. 
at 42. As the driver got out of the Jeep, Beebe noticed a syringe cap on the car floor, 
"by the driver's side where the lever would be to release the seat back/forward." 
Id. at 42,43. Beebe testified that his training and experience led him to believe this 
was drug paraphernalia used for the ingestion of methamphetamine. Id. at 43-44. 
He testified, "After observing the syringe cap, I advised everyone to put their hands 
where I could see them. . . [to] fr[ee]ze the environment/' Id. at 44. 
Once the driver was out of the car, frisked, and sent over to the other 
detectives, Officer Beebe turned his attention to the driver's side back seat 
passenger, defendant. Beebe opened the car door and asked defendant to step out. 
Id. at 44,93. Officer Beebe testified, "As I spoke with him I noticed that his skin tone 
was flush, that he also had red, bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils." Id. at 93; accord 
id. at 52,102. The officer frisked defendant. Feeling "several items" in defendant's 
pockets, Beebe initially asked defendant to empty them. Id. at 44. When defendant 
reached in, however, the officer asked him to stop, realizing that he would be at risk 
if defendant had a weapon. Id. at 50. The officer then completed the search, 
discovering in defendant's pocket a dollar bill folded into a bindle, containing a 
6 
white crystalline substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine. 2 Id. at 
44,95,102-03- He also found bolts, screws, a pocket knife, and other unspecified 
miscellany- Id. at 56-57. Officer Beebe arrested defendant for the unlawful 
possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly denied defendant's suppression motion because the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which defendant was riding 
and because the frisk was justified under the totality of the circumstances. 
Defendant contests the frisk but not the search of his person. While his 
brief contains some language referencing the search, his specific argument is not 
readily discernible. See Appellant Br. at 16-17. Under such circumstances, this 
Court should decline to consider his claim. Briefing requirements are articulated in 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and require not only that the appealing 
party cite pertinent authority but also that the party develop that supporting 
authority through reasoned analysis. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). A party must 
carefully analyze and apply the cited authority to the facts of the case in order to 
convince the reviewing court that a specific and harmful mistake has been made. 
An issue is inadequately briefed '"when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking 
as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court/" State v. 
Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,113,72 P.3d 138 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, 
18,995 P.2d 14). When this occurs, as here, the reviewing court should decline to 
consider the issue on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,113,974 P.2d 269 
(when a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis of a claim, reviewing court 
declines to consider the merits). 
Defendant's only cogent argument related to the search is that the 
unlawfulness of the frisk rendered evidence found in the subsequent search 
inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Appellant Br. at 11,20. Where the 
frisk was lawful, however, there is no such fruit. 
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Specifically, information provided by a reliable confidential informant and 
corroborated by Officer Beebe created reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle for 
further investigation of drug distribution. Once the vehicle was properly stopped 
and the driver was asked out of the car, the totality of the circumstances justified the 
frisk of defendant. The officer, outnumbered even with his backup, was faced with 
five people in a vehicle suspected of transporting an unknown quantity of 
methamphetamine for the purpose of distribution; it was the middle of the night; 
the back seat passengers had made furtive movements toward the rear of the vehicle 
before it belatedly pulled over; and both the driver and defendant appeared to be 
under the influence of methamphetamine. Knowing that one occupant was directly 
implicated in transporting drugs for distribution and that drug dealers are often 
armed, the officer frisked defendant, who had been sitting in the back seat. Under 
this totality of circumstances, the officer's action was justified to ensure that 
defendant was not carrying a dangerous weapon. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY A RELIABLE 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND CORROBORATED BY 
THE OFFICER CREATED REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP 
THE VEHICLE IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS RIDING FOR 
FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his suppression 
motion because he was stopped in violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against unlawful seizures. In his view, "[t]he confidential informant's tip was 
insufficient to effectuate a stop of Albert's vehicle." Appellant Br. at 14. 
Specifically, he contends that "the tip from the confidential informant was too vague 
to be relied upon by the officers." Id. at 12. He also asserts that "the police stopped 
the car before the tip could actually be corroborated." Id. at 15. For his analysis, 
defendant relies on Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997).3 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court orally denied defendant's 
suppression motion: 
3
 The Utah Supreme Court abrogated Mulcahy in State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 
105,104 P.3d 1265, a warrants case. Saddler rejected Mulcahy's rigid three-part test 
in favor of the more flexible totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Defendant thus 
incorrectly relies on Mulcahy for his analysis of the lawfulness of the stop. 
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There was probable cause based on the information from the informant 
to stop the vehicle and to believe that the vehicle was containing drugs. 
The informant was fairly knowledgeable in the area and actually 
conducted [sic] by virtue of having talked to Ms. Albert, and also the 
officer had used the informant before and knew that the informant was 
- had provided reliable information in the past. 
In this case the officer did substantial corroboration of the information 
provided by the informant by lis -by hearing him talking on his phone 
to Ms. Albert on the way down getting a - and then eventually Ms. 
Albert showed up at the location where the officers expected on a back 
road coming back to her home. So the totality of the circumstances 
would support probable cause based on what the informant said and 
then what - on the independent observations of the officer, probable 
cause to pull the vehicle over. 
R. 176: 66-67 at addendum A. While the trial court applied a probable cause 
standard, higher than the reasonable suspicion standard required to lawfully 
effectuate a stop, its reasoning is essentially sound. 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, including investigatory stops of automobiles. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648,653 (1979). The law is well-settled that "[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, a 
police officer is justified in stopping a vehicle when the officer... has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that the driver committed or is about to commit a crime, such 
as transporting drugs." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137,141 (Utah App. 1997). The 
inquiry on review must then focus on whether Officer Beebe "had a reasonable 
10 
articulable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants were involved in illegally 
transporting drugs/' Id. 
To comply with the reasonable suspicion standard, "the seizure must be 
based on specific articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn 
from them, would lead a reasonable person to conclude defendant had committed 
or was about to commit a crime/' State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825,827 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citing State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85,88 (Utah App. 1987)). There is no bright line test 
for determining when reasonable suspicion exists. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213,215 
(Utah App. 1991). Rather, courts employ a totality of the circumstances test, 
recognizing that police officers, by virtue of their specialized experience, can 
sometimes recognize illegal activity where ordinary citizens would not. Sykes, 840 
P.2d at 827; State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363,1366 n.2 (Utah App. 1987). "Reasonable 
suspicion... is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police 
and its degree of reliability. Both factors-quantity and quality-are considered in the 
'totality of the circumstances— the whole picture/" Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 
330 (1990) (quoting United States v. Cortex, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981)). 
Here, Officer Beebe began with good quality information—a tip from a 
confidential informant with whom he had worked on multiple occasions and who 
had established his reliability by consistently providing Beebe with sound 
11 
information that had led to multiple drug distribution prosecutions- R. 176:34-36. 
The content of the information was also good. While the CI originally reported only 
that Mary Albert was in Salt Lake to pick up methamphetamine for distribution in 
Utah County and that defendant was with her, the CI subsequently contacted her at 
least three more times, in each instance adding to the quantity of information on 
which the police relied. First, the CI set up a drug buy at Albert's home. Id. at 36, 
47. Second, the CI tracked Albert's progress, learning that she had stopped to pick 
up an additional passenger. Id. at 37. And third, the CI pinpointed Albert's location 
as she drove between R.C. Willey in Orem and her home via back roads. Id. 
Officer Beebe was well-positioned to corroborate the reliability of the CI's 
information. He was "very familiar" with Mary Albert's vehicle and so had no 
trouble identifying it as it approached his surveillance location. Id. at 38. 
Moreover, the vehicle appeared on a route and after a time interval consistent with 
the CI's last phone call to Albert and her report that she was traveling on back roads 
between R.C. Willey and her home. Id. at 38,90. The officer also observed at least 
12 
three people in the vehicle.4 Finally, the officer immediately recognized both Albert 
and defendant as passengers in the vehicle. Id. at 39. 
In addition to the facts, rational inferences may be considered in assessing 
reasonable suspicion. Sykes, 840 P.2d at 827. While the CFs tip specifically 
identified Albert as the purchaser of the drugs for distribution, it is reasonable to 
infer that the people traveling with her in the middle of the night might also well be 
involved in a common enterprise centering on drug distribution. See Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999) (car passenger, unlike tavern patron, "will 
often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and have the same 
interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing"). 
In light of the CFs reliability and Officer Beebe's corroborative personal 
observations, the totality of the circumstances establish that the officer had objective 
facts to support a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle were 
illegally transporting drugs. No more was necessary to justify his investigatory stop 
of the vehicle in order to confirm or dispel that suspicion. 
In addition to Mary Albert, defendant, and the person they picked up on 
the way, Mary Albert's son and defendant's spouse were also in the vehicle, making 
a total of five people. R. 176: 80. 
13 
II. 
THE FRISK OF DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, INCLUDING THE 
LATENESS OF THE HOUR, THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE 
VEHICLE, THE CI'S TIP THAT AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY OF 
METHAMPHETAMINE WAS BEING TRANSPORTED FOR 
DISTRIBUTION, THE FURTIVE MOVEMENTS OF THE 
BACKSEAT PASSENGERS, THE OBSERVED SIGNS OF DRUG 
IMPAIRMENT IN BOTH THE DRIVER AND DEFENDANT, 
AND THE OFFICER'S KNOWLEDGE THAT DRUG DEALERS 
ARE OFTEN ARMED 
Defendant argues that the frisk of his person violated the Fourth Amendment 
because the furtive movements of the backseat passengers were not sufficient to 
create reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous.5 See 
Appellant Br. at 18-20. The trial court disagreed, ruling that reasonable suspicion 
supported the pat-down. R. 176:67-68 at addendum A. 
The law is well-settled that where an officer has reason to believe that a 
lawfully detained person "maybe armed and presently dangerous/' the officer may 
"conduct a carefully limited search of the [person's] outer clothing" to determine 
"whether title person is in fact carrying a weapon." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30,24 
(1968); accord State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,113,78 P.3d 590. An officer, however, 
5
 Defend ant also briefly references the officer's observation of the syringe cap 
on the floor of the car. See Appellant Br. at 18. He does not, however, develop any 
argument about this paraphernalia or explain its significance to the point he is 
trying to make. 
14 
may not perform a protective search based on an "inchoate and imparticularized 
suspicion or liunch/" Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 14 The 
officer must have "some minimal level of objective justification." INS v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 217 (1984). Officers "must be able to point to specific facts which, 
considered with rational inferences from those facts," give rise to a reasonable belief 
that the person may be presently armed or may gain immediate control of a 
weapon. Warren, 2003 UT 36, at \ 14 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21); accord Michigan v. 
Long, 463 U.S 1032,1049-50 (1983). 
In determining whether a particular protective search was justified, the 
overarching question for courts is "whether 'the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of... the search warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that 
the action taken was appropriate/ " Warren, 2003 UT 36, at f 14 (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 21-22) (internal quotation omitted). "Courts must . . . avoid the temptation to 
divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other." Warren, 2003 UT 
36, at 114 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2003)). Instead, they 
"must view the articulable facts in their totality." Id.; see also State v. Lafond, 2003 UT 
App 101, % 19,68 P.3d 1043 (citing 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.5(a), at 
255-56 (3d ed. 1996) (articulating two basic scenarios warranting Terry frisks, the 
first of which analyzes all the unique facts and circumstances that give rise to 
15 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect may be armed)). And although the Court 
applies an objective standard, it must give "due weight... to the specific reasonable 
inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience/' Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord Warren, 2003 UT 36, at H 20-21 
(recognizing that "an officer's own evaluation of the circumstances/' based on his or 
her training and experience, "factor[s] into the objective analysis"). 
In this case, defendant relies solely on the back seat passengers' furtive 
movements towards the rear of the vehicle prior to the stop to argue that Officer 
Beebe lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk him. See Appellant Br. at 18-20. 
Defendant, however, ignores the totality of the circumstances with which Officer 
Beebe was faced. Officer Beebe was acting on a tip from a reliable informant that an 
unknown quantity of methamphetamine was being transported from Salt Lake to 
Utah County for distribution. R. 176:36; cf. Lafond, 2003 UT App 101 at 119 (noting 
that dealing in large quantities of narcotics, by its inherent nature, gives rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, but that dealing in small quantities 
does not give rise to reasonable suspicion (citation omitted)). When Officer Beebe 
turned on his lights and chirped his siren, the vehicle did not pull over immediately, 
as the officer expected. R. 176: 90-91. Moreover, while the vehicle was still 
traveling, Officer Beebe observed "people in the rear of the vehicle reaching to the 
16 
very far back of the Jeep Cherokee/' Id. at 91. Officer Beebe knew from experience 
that drug dealers often arm themselves for protection from the police and other 
drug dealers.6 Id. at 41. Further, the stop occurred at 3:00 a.m. Id. at 90. And there 
were five individuals in the suspect vehicle, but only four officers on or near the 
scene. Id. at 80; R. 173:10,11-12; see Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,412 (1997) 
("the fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible 
sources of harm to the officer"). 
Approaching the driver, Officer Beebe immediately recognized signs of 
methamphetamine impairment. R. 176:42. And as soon as the driver exited the car, 
the officer saw drug paraphernalia on the floor of the vehicle.7 Id. at 43. Suspecting 
drug transportation and observing the results of drug usage, Officer Beebe directed 
6
 In State v. Baker, this court determined that a frisk was unlawful, where the 
officers had already collected 13 dangerous weapons from the driver and 
passengers of a stopped vehicle. In addition, an officer specifically testified that he 
frisked defendant for an unlawful purpose, "to search for drugs and contraband." 
Baker, 2008 UT App 115,118,182 P.3d 935. Here, in contrast, the officer suspected 
that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant might well be armed. 
Indeed, he testified that he was concerned for his safety because he knew from 
experience that "[individuals in the drug culture often arm themselves to protect 
themselves from the criminal element and from law enforcement." R. 176:41. 
7
 Defendant accurately notes the trial court's clearly erroneous finding that 
syringes were found in the seat pocket in front of defendant. See Appellant Br. at 17. 
Only a syringe cap was found on the driver's side of the car. R. 176:43. The court's 
inaccuracy, however, is harmless under the totality of the circumstances analysis. 
17 
all five occupants "to put their hands where [he] could see them.. . [to] fr[ee]ze the 
environment/7 Id. at 44. Ordering defendant out of the car, Beebe saw that he, too, 
was impaired, and frisked him as well. Id. at 44,93. 
Where defendant was traveling with Mary Albert late at night, just as 
predicted by the CI who reported she was on a drug run, the officer could 
reasonably infer that defendant might be part of a common enterprise involving 
drug distribution. He could also infer that the backseat passengers' furtive 
movements might involve weapons with which to protect the contraband. These 
inferences, combined with the recited objective facts, considered as a totality, amply 
justified the officer's determination that defendant might well be armed with a 
dangerous weapon and should be frisked. No more is necessary to justify his 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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1 to present to the Court a warrant to search the automobile 
2 and a warrant to be able to search Mr. Jack Wilkinson based upon 
3 the fact that he appeared to be consistent — he appeared to be 
4 I under the influence consistent with methamphetamine, there is 
5 paraphernalia in the car and the information he had about Jack 
6 Wilkinson going to purchase these drugs, your Honor, I think that 
7 that would have supported a search warrant, and affi — that 
8 would have supported a warrant. 
9 Your Honor, the analysis, obviously, the Court knows is 
10 not whether reasonable doubt, it's just probable cause that the 
11 item is going to be found. Certainly when four people — three 
12 people are returning — four or three people returning from 
13 Salt Lake from purchasing methamphetamine and you have all that 
14 additional information, your Honor, certainly there's a probable 
15 cause to believe that possibly that methamphetamine might be 
16 stashed on the persons in the car, and that there is probable 
17 cause to believe that the other persons in the car are aware of 
18 the criminal enterprise that's going on. We'll submit it. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. The Court 
20 first notes that Mr. Wilkinson does have a reasonable expectation 
21 of privacy in his pants and shirt pockets. So that's kind of the 
22 issue here is was the officer justified in going into his pockets 
23 by an exception to the exclusionary rule. 
24 There was probable cause based on the information from 
25 the informant to stop the vehicle and to believe that the vehicle 
L 
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1 was containing drugs. The informant was fairly knowledgeable 
2 in the area and actually conducted by virtue of having talked to 
3 Ms. Albert, and also the officer had used the informant before 
4 and knew that the informant was — had provided reliable 
5 information in the past. 
6 In this case the officer did substantial corroboration 
7 of the information provided by the informant by lis — by hearing 
8 him talking on his phone to Ms. Albert on the way down getting 
9 a — and then eventually Ms. Albert showed up at the location 
10 where the officers expected on a back road coming back to her 
11 home. So the totality of the circumstances would support 
12 probable cause based on what the informant said and then what — 
13 on the independent observations of the officer, probable cause to 
14 pull the vehicle over. 
15 Once the officer — to see whether there were drugs in 
16 I it. Of course, once there's probable cause regarding the motor 
17 vehicle, then the automobile exception, and also plain view 
18 doctrine sort of supported the officer conducting the search. In 
19 this case, seeing the syringe cap and then looking in the pockets 
20 finding the syr — on the back of the seat finding the syringes 
21 j and so forth, that would have eventually been okay. 
22 Now as to taking Mr. Wilkinson out of the vehicle and 
23 patting him down, there was a reasonable suspicion, I believe, at 
24 a minimum to ask him to come out and get patted down. Further, I 
25 believe that there was probable cause to believe that he may be 
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1 involved in possessing illegal drugs because the officer 
2 I observed him to have dilated pupils and he appeared to be 
3 under the influence of drugs. I'm talking specifically about 
4 Mr. Wilkinson at this point. 
5 So on the pat down the officer felt objects in 
6 Mr. Wilkinson's pocket that were — some were consistent with 
7 being contraband, some were consistent with being weapons. The 
8 bag of bolts, the pocketknife — although that — I agree with 
9 Mr. Silva. This seems to be a fairly late development; 
10 nevertheless, the officer recalls there being a pocketknife. 
11 So at that point the officer would have number one, had 
12 reason to further the search in order to — in the interest of 
13 his safety to make sure that there weren't any weapons, and 
14 seeing Mr. Wilkinson reach into his pocket, that would heighten 
15 objectively the reason for the officer telling Mr, Wilkinson to 
16 stop and the officer would look into his pocket. So that would 
17 be one ground on which the exce — there would be an exception to 
18 the exclusionary rule, was officer's safety following the Terry 
19 search. 
20 The other ground would be that because the syringes 
21 were discovered right in front of — in the seat pocket where 
22 Mr. Wilkinson was sitting where his knees would have been, 
23 essentially, Mr. Wilkinson — there would have been probable 
24 cause to arrest based on the location of those syringes. 
25 Therefore, the contraband in the pockets would have been subject 
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25 
to a search (inaudible) lawful arrest, which would be — 
there's a contemporaneous issue. This would have been 
contemporaneous with an arrest, and also an inevitable 
discovery rule. 
so 
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So based on that, I think that in this case there was — 
that the search was supported by an exception to the exclusionary 
rule, and so the Court will deny the motion to suppress. 
Now Counsel, do you want to take a break before you do 
your opening statements, or — do you need a break for a few 
minutes, Mr. Silva, before you do your opening statements? 
MR. SILVA: Yes, your Honor. My client would like a 
recess. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we take about 10 minutes. 
Just tell the jury we're sorry, but we had some matters we had to 
take care of, but we'll start up — tell them we'll start up at 
10 after with opening statements of Counsel. 
MR. KENNARD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
COURT BAILIFF: All rise. 
THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 
(Short recess taken) 
(Court already in session when recorder was turned on) 
THE COURT: Call the jury back in? 
MR. KENNARD: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Those present when the Court recessed 
